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This paper provides evidence on the impact of transient (short-term) institutional in-
vestors on a firm’s thrust to compete. A firm’s thrust to compete, as an attribute of cor-
porate culture, captures the relative importance of corporate values that push a firm to
achieve shareholder value in the short term by emphasizing goal achievement, fast re-
sponse to external information and enhanced competitiveness. We find that greater own-
ership by transient investors results in firms intensifying their future thrust to compete,
suggesting that firms respond to these investors’ preferences and competitive pressures
for achieving short-term value creation. In line with our expectations, this effect is not
observed for firms with greater ownership by long-horizon institutional investors, who are
incentivized to place their emphasis on long-term firm value over short-term gains. Our
findings reveal that the composition of institutional ownership influences the organiza-
tional culture of firms in a non-homogeneous way. As such, we provide significant empiri-
cal insights for the ongoing debate on the implications arising from the behind-the-scenes
engagement of institutional investors with management.
Introduction
A growing body of literature emphasizes the
importance of shared organizational beliefs, prin-
ciples, social norms and other intangible structures
for a firm’s ability to improve its corporate policies
and performance (e.g. Andreou, Harris and Philip,
2020; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Graham et al.,
2019; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2015; Jiang
et al., 2019; Zingales, 2015). These studies suggest
that such organizational attributes shape the cor-
porate culture that influences firms’ operating phi-
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losophy and guides their managements’ decision-
making. Another burgeoning literature documents
empirical evidence linking the investment horizon
of institutional investors to various economic
outcomes (e.g. Appel, Gormley and Keim, 2016;
Bushee, 2001; Dyck et al., 2019; Edmans, 2009;
Giannetti and Yu, 2020). While these studies
provide insights relating to firm policies, whether
institutional investors also influence a firm’s
operating philosophy – which governs a firm’s
decision-making as a whole – remains unexplored.
In this study, the central focus of investigation
is a firm’s thrust to compete, a notable attribute
of corporate culture that we hypothesize to be
influenced by diverse institutional ownership
horizons. When firms have a larger proportion
of transient (short-term) investors, as opposed to
non-transient (long-term) investors, it exposes the
firm’s operations to undue pressure for short-term
performance (Bushee, 1998, 2001; Dikolli, Kulp
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and Sedatole, 2009). Therefore, the management
of firms will emphasize short-term performance
and spurs the firm to compete to deliver fast results
and boost current earnings. These actions will ex-
tend to the organizational culture, which becomes
more focused around competition, placing em-
phasis on goals, success and achieving results right
now.1 In contrast, the thrust-to-compete effect will
be unobserved for firms with a larger proportion
of non-transient institutional investors, such as
dedicated investors and quasi-indexers, who place
their emphasis on maximizing long-term value
and demand transparency (Boone and White,
2015; Bushee, 1998, 2001). Thus, the study con-
tributes towards answering the wider question
of whether institutional investors influence an or-
ganization’s culture. This question is meaningful
to explore since the recent literature highlights
that institutional investors regularly engage with
management and boards of directors to impact
firms’ economic decision-making, such as invest-
ments, mergers and acquisitions, payouts, debt
financing costs, earnings management practices,
governance, information environment, stock price
pressures, credit risk, etc. (e.g. Brav, Jiang and
Kim, 2015; Callen and Fang, 2013; Cella, Ellul
and Giannetti, 2013; Chen, Harford and Li, 2007;
Crane,Michenaud andWeston, 2015; Edmans and
Manso, 2011; Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005;
Switzer andWang, 2017). Interestingly, and related
to the above, a recent paper by Dyck et al. (2019)
provides strong causal evidence that institutional
investors drive environmental and social (E&S)
performance changes in the firms they own. The
paper identifies private (i.e. behind the scenes) en-
gagement as themost likely channel throughwhich
institutional investors push firms for a change that
reflects their own financial return preferences.2
To identify a firm’s thrust to compete, we rely on
the competing values framework (CVF), named
as one of the 40 most important frameworks in
1A recent survey of C-suite executives and directors, con-
ducted by the McKinsey Global Institute, suggests that
87% of executives and directors indeed feel under pres-
sure to demonstrate strong financial performance in the
short term (Barton, Bailey and Zoffer, 2016).
2For example, Dyck et al. (2019) discuss how investors
with short investment horizons, such as hedge funds, are
unlikely to support firms’ E&S strategies, whereas in-
vestors with long investment horizons, such as pension
funds, are more likely to push firms to pursue E&S strate-
gies right now for benefits potentially far in the future.
the history of business (Ten Have, Ten Have and
Stevens, 2003). The CVF is a conceptual frame-
work synthesizing various organizational theories
to identify criteria for organizational effectiveness
(Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). It posits that every
organization has a blend of four types of organiza-
tional culture, namely the results-oriented compete
culture, the innovation and entrepreneurial create
culture, the process-oriented control culture and the
people-oriented collaborate culture. The criteria
that differentiate the four are the competing do-
mains of internal versus external focus and stabil-
ity versus flexibility (Cameron et al., 2014). Based
on this framework, we measure thrust to compete
as the relative importance of corporate values
surrounding the compete culture, which propels a
firm to achieve superior financial performance by
emphasizing customer focus, fast response to ex-
ternal information and enhanced competitiveness.
We measure a firm’s thrust to compete by ex-
ploiting textual information from a large corpus of
firms’ annual 10-K filings describing their current
and future operating environment. This measure-
ment technique follows the growing literature that
utilizes natural language processing techniques
on corporate reports and filings to measure im-
portant information about firms’ activities and
management (e.g. Andreou, Harris and Philip,
2020; Bushman, Hendricks and Williams, 2016;
Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Hoberg and Phillips,
2016; Li, Lundholm and Minnis, 2013; Loughran
and McDonald, 2011). To measure a firm’s thrust
to compete, we use the following steps. First, we
estimate the four corporate cultures, as theorized
under the CVF, namely compete, create, control
and collaborate, by parsing 10-K filings using the
Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument
(OCAI) bag of words developed to capture aspects
underpinning each culture. Our textual measure
of culture using the OCAI bag of words and
its construct validation is discussed in Andreou
et al. (2020a). Second, firms’ thrust to compete is
computed as the frequency of words describing
the compete culture scaled by the total number of
words describing all four CVF cultures. The scal-
ing enables us to measure the relative importance a
firm places on corporate values underpinning the
compete culture vis-à-vis other corporate cultures
at a given point in time.
Our empirical results provide robust evidence
that transient institutional ownership has a strong
positive impact on firms’ thrust to compete. The
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result is in line with evidence showing that tran-
sient institutions focus their investments on the
likelihood of reaping short-term trading profits
(Bushee, 1998, 2001). Therefore, transient in-
vestors are likely to create pressure on managers
to intensify firms’ thrust to compete and to adopt
an operating philosophy that emphasizes results
right now (aiming for short-term superior perfor-
mance). The management of firms with higher
proportions of transient institutional ownership
may succumb to the pressures and threats of these
investors to exit and sell off their stakes. This is in
keeping with previous studies documenting that
institutional investors can affect a firm’s gover-
nance and operations through exits or the threat
to exit (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans and
Manso, 2011; Giannetti and Yu, 2020; Parrino,
Sias and Starks, 2003). Further, this aligns with
the survey evidence of McCahery, Sautner and
Starks (2016), reporting that 63% of the 143 large
institutional investor respondents stated that they
have recently engaged in direct discussions with
management, while a large proportion of them
view exit as a viable strategy, with 49% stating that
they had exited a portfolio firm because of dissatis-
faction with the firm’s performance. Accordingly,
our results indicate that the dominant cultural
perception of success for firms with a high propor-
tion of transient investors will be to focus more
externally on delivering superior (short-term)
performance.
In contrast to the above findings, we observe
that firms with high proportions of non-transient
institutional investors (dedicated investors and
quasi-indexers) have a negative or insignificant
relationship with firms’ future thrust to compete.
Non-transient institutional investors hold diver-
sified portfolios, engage in long-term investment
relationships with firms and have different expec-
tations about performance (Appel, Gormley and
Keim, 2016; Bushee, 2001; Cella, Ellul and Gian-
netti, 2013; Chen, Harford and Li, 2007; Crane,
Michenaud and Weston, 2015). More specifically,
dedicated institutional investors are active in mon-
itoring managers against agency issues and have
incentives to reduce myopic investment behaviour,
mostly by relying on information beyond cur-
rent earnings to appraise managers’ performance
(Callen and Fang, 2013; Chen, Harford and Li,
2007; Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005; Harford,
Kecskes and Mansi, 2018). In a similar vein,
quasi-indexers are motivated to demand firms’
transparency, which can enhance monitoring and
lead managers to disclose more information to in-
vestors (Appel, Gormley and Keim, 2016; Boone
and White, 2015). Collectively, our results suggest
that managers of firms with large proportions
of non-transient investors do not significantly
increase their thrust to compete in the pursuit of
short-term gains. Because of the obvious diver-
gence in the performance preferences that exist
between transient and non-transient institutional
investors, the lack of a positive relationship be-
tween thrust to compete and firms with high pro-
portions of non-transient institutional investors
supports the validity of the main hypothesis in
the study surrounding the impact of transient
investors on the firms’ operating philosophy.
In terms of identification and research design,
we employ several econometric approaches to
mitigate endogeneity concerns arising from either
unobservable heterogeneity or reverse causality
running from thrust to compete to institutional
ownership. First, we implement a random effects
model to account for unobserved firm hetero-
geneity, wherein we include a large set of controls
for firm characteristics and also control for non-
transient institutions, which present the highest
stickiness in time (emanating from their low-
turnover, buy-and-hold trading behaviour). When
identifying the effects of different institutional in-
vestor types, random effects models provide valid
estimates of parameters that appear to change
sluggishly in time (Clark and Linzer, 2015), par-
ticularly in the case of dedicated investors and
quasi-indexers, due to their persistent nature and
little within-firm variation. However, since our
main interest is to examine the impact of transient
investors, we augment the identification strategy
by also implementing firm fixed effects models.
The estimation of firm fixed effects models pro-
vides complementary evidence by controlling for
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Second,
prior research finds that institutional ownership
is endogenously determined by certain firm char-
acteristics (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Accord-
ingly, following the approach of Ramalingegowda
and Yu (2012), we treat such omitted variable
concerns by estimating the main relationships
using residual ownership, taken from an expected
ownership model that expresses ownership as a
function of economic determinants. Third, we em-
ploy an instrumental variable approach, following
Bushee (2001) and Callen and Fang (2013), where
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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we instrument for institutional ownership. Fourth,
considering the time persistency of thrust to com-
pete and institutional ownership variables, we also
report time-dynamic regressions, where we allow
for a 3-year period between the measurement of
institutional ownership and thrust to compete.
In this way, we mitigate potential endogeneity
concerns ascribable to potential reverse-causality
explanations. Fifth, we estimate a dynamic panel
generalized method of moments (GMM) model,
since it is plausible that the relationship between
thrust to compete and institutional ownership
is dynamically endogenous and thus the causa-
tion may run both ways. Therefore, to control
for potential dynamic endogeneity of this kind,
we follow Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) by
adopting the dynamic panel GMM approach
(as proposed by Arellano and Bover, 1995 and
Blundell and Bond, 1998).
Our study contributes to the literature in at
least two distinct ways. First, our main finding
that institutional ownership affects organizations’
cultural orientations that spur firms to compete
adds to our understanding of the important
implications of institutional investors’ behind-
the-scenes engagement with management. In this
regard, our findings complement a burgeoning
literature that provides evidence that institutional
investors’ preferences and actions affect the op-
erating environment of organizations (e.g. Brav,
Jiang and Kim, 2015; Crane, Michenaud and
Weston, 2015; Dyck et al., 2019; Giannetti and
Yu, 2020; Harford, Kecskes and Mansi, 2018;
McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016; Switzer
and Wang, 2017). Second, we introduce a richer
text-based firm-level competition measure, which
captures firms’ internal operating philosophy gov-
erning their competitive actions. Previous studies
(e.g. Bushman, Hendricks and Williams, 2016; Li,
Lundholm and Minnis, 2013) rely on the usage
frequency of a small set of competition words (i.e.
competition(s), competitor(s), competitive, com-
pete(s) and competing) from firms’ 10-K filings
to measure managers’ perceptions of competitive-
ness. In contrast, our text-based thrust-to-compete
measure is founded on theory delineated in the
CVF and captures internal corporate values that
spur firms to cater to the external environment (i.e.
to increase competitiveness) with the objective of
achieving superior shareholder value. Thus, our
measure not only captures the firms’ competitive
environment, but also the actions firms undertake
to adapt to the competitive environment to achieve
the desired goals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: details of the data and summary statistics
are reported in the next section. The third section
presents the main empirical findings and addi-
tional analyses, while the fourth section concludes.
Data, measures and variables
We build our dataset by merging information from
various data sources for the period 1994–2018.
We obtain annual firm-level data of US publicly
traded firms from Compustat, excluding financials
(SIC 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999),
stock price data fromCRSP, the firms’ 10-K filings
from SEC’s Edgar database and institutional own-
ership information from the Thomson Reuters
Institutional Holdings Database. The final sample
consists of 52,882 observations for 6,867 unique
firms. Table 1 reports detailed variable definitions.
Measurement of thrust to compete
We measure thrust to compete from the organiza-
tional culture classifications of the CVF. The CVF
classifies firms’ corporate values into four cultures
by differentiating between those values of the firm
that emphasize an external orientation and those
that focus on internal capabilities – the so-called
external–internal domain. Further, it distinguishes
corporate values concerned with effectiveness that
focus on flexibility and discretion from those that
are centred on stability and internal control – the
flexibility–stability domain. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, these two dimensions intersect to define four
distinct types of corporate culture that comprise
the CVF, namely compete, create, control and
collaborate.
Organizations characterized by the compete
culture (bottom-right corner of Figure 1) are
externally focused and market-driven, and hence
are more likely to encourage organization-wide
generation, dissemination and integration of ex-
ternal environmental information (Cameron et al.,
2014; Hartnell, Ou and Kinicki, 2011; Quinn
and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Success for such firms is
assessed based on indicators such as increased
sales growth, profitability and market share. An
important ingredient of their corporate operating
philosophy is results right now, hence doing things
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Variable definitions
Abbreviation Definition
Dependent variables
Thrust to compete TC = Decile rank of thrust to compete computed each fiscal year based on the
Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification. Thrust to compete is
estimated as the number of lexical items spanning the compete culture
divided by the total number of lexical items spanning all four CVF
corporate cultures as per Eq. (1). The lexical items spanning the CVF
corporate cultures are shown in Table 3. [Source: Annual 10-K filings in
the SEC Edgar database]
Product market competition PROC_COMP = Decile rank of Li et al.’s (2013) textual product market competition
measure computed each fiscal year based on the Fama and French
(1997) 48-industry classification. The measure is computed by counting
the number of times the words ‘competition(s)’, ‘competitor(s)’,
‘competitive’, ‘compete(s)’, ‘competing’ appear in a firm’s 10-K filing
(minus those occasions when these words are preceded by ‘not’, ‘less’,
‘few’ or ‘limited’, with a gap of three or fewer words), divided by the






TRA = Percentage of stock ownership in the firm owned by transient institutional
investors, where, following Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000),
transient investors are denoted as those with high portfolio turnover and
diversified portfolios. [Source: Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F)




DED = Percentage of stock ownership in the firm owned by dedicated institutional
investors, where, following Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000),
dedicated investors are denoted as those with low turnover and more
concentrated holdings. [Source: Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F)




QIX = Percentage of stock ownership in the firm owned by quasi-indexers, where,
following Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000), quasi-indexers are
denoted as those investors with low turnover and diversified holdings.
[Source: Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings and Professor




TRA_RESID = Residual transient institutional investors’ stock ownership, defined as the
residual from an expected ownership model that expresses transient
ownership (TRA) as a function of its economic determinants: firm age,
dividend yield, S&P membership, stock price volatility, firm size, stock
price, share turnover, book-to-market ratio, momentum, Tobin’s Q and
bid–ask spread. Estimation of the residual ownership follows the
approach in Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012), as modelled by Eq. (A1)




DED_RESID = Residual dedicated institutional investors’ stock ownership, defined as the
residual from an expected ownership model that expresses dedicated
ownership (DED) as a function of its economic determinants: firm age,
dividend yield, S&P membership, stock price volatility, firm size, stock
price, share turnover, book-to-market ratio, momentum, Tobin’s Q and
bid–ask spread. Estimation of the residual ownership follows the
approach in Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012), as modelled by Eq. (A1)




QIX_RESID = Residual quasi-indexer institutional investors’ stock ownership, defined as
the residual from an expected ownership model that expresses
quasi-indexer ownership (QIX) as a function of its economic
determinants: firm age, dividend yield, S&P membership, stock price
volatility, firm size, stock price, share turnover, book-to-market ratio,
momentum, Tobin’s Q and bid–ask spread. Estimation of the residual
ownership follows the approach in Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012), as
modelled by Eq. (A1) in their appendix. [Source: Compustat, CRSP]
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Firm age AGE = Number of years since the firm first appears in Compustat. [Source:
Compustat]
Leverage LEV = Long-term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT). [Source: Compustat]








RD_CUT = Equal to one if the firm’s research and development expenditure in fiscal
year t (XRD) is less than that in fiscal year t−1, and zero otherwise.
[Source: Compustat]
Return on assets ROA = Income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by total assets (AT).
[Source: Compustat]
Firm size SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity (CSHO × PRCC_F).
[Source: Compustat]
Gunning FOG index for the
readability of the 10-K
filing
FOG = 0.4 × (average number of words per sentence + percentage of complex
words), where complex words consist of three or more syllables. [Source:
annual 10-K filings in the SEC Edgar database]
10-K filing size in kilobytes FILESIZE = Natural logarithm of the file size in kilobytes of the 10-K filing. [Source:
annual 10-K filings in the SEC Edgar database]
10-K filing language tone NETTONE = Difference between the positive and negative language tone measures of
Loughran and McDonald (2011). [Source: Professor Bill McDonald’s
personal website]
This table presents definitions for the variables used in the study’s empirical analyses.
fast and effectively is an essential element in main-
taining a competitive edge. Corporate values of
this kind are strongly associated with enhanced
operating effectiveness and high achievements,
which are important determinants of the firms’
shareholder value creation process. Overall, such
firms naturally have a thrust to compete as they
strive to accomplish superior financial perfor-
mance by engendering enhanced competitiveness
and emphasizing organizational effectiveness, fast
response and customer focus.
In comparison, corporate values associated
with the create culture (upper-right corner of
Figure 1) are focused externally and centre on cre-
ating future opportunity through innovation and
cutting-edge output. These elements within the
firms are supported by a flexible organizational
structure which fosters freedom of thought and
action among employees and allows the firm to
effectively handle discontinuity, change and risk
(Cameron et al., 2014; Hartnell, Ou and Kinicki,
2011). Conversely, the control and collaborate
cultures are internally focused, placing emphasis
on integration. However, while the collaborate
culture stresses employee development and con-
sensus building, which is facilitated by a flexible
organizational structure aimed at long-term de-
velopment, the control culture focuses on creating
value through internal improvements in efficiency,
supported by a stable organizational structure that
is driven by strong internal control mechanisms
(Cameron et al., 2014; Quinn and Rohrbaugh,
1983; Hartnell, Ou and Kinicki, 2011).
While the CVF framework is a renowned taxon-
omy of organizational cultures, the identification
of an organization’s culture requires a valid as-
sessment instrument. Cameron and Quinn (2011)
propose the OCAI, a questionnaire developed
to measure organizational culture through the
responses of firms’ employees (see Table A1 in the
online supporting information). It evaluates orga-
nizational culture along six dimensions, including
dominant characteristics, organizational leader-
ship, management of employees, organization
glue, strategic emphases and criteria of success.
The OCAI questionnaire enables firms’ manage-
ment to periodically review their cultural profile
from the perspective of their own employees at all
levels (Cameron et al., 2014).
To measure a firm’s thrust to compete, we rely
on the methodology outlined by Andreou et al.
(2020a), who use the OCAI questionnaire to
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develop a lexicon of culture-related words. The
words are selected from the OCAI questionnaire
itself, and therefore the resulting lexicon encom-
passes the multiple dimensions that firms consider
to be important in measuring their organizational
culture. The development of the lexicon is achieved
by a four-step procedure. First, select the culture-
related words from the OCAI questionnaire.
Second, include all corresponding synonyms from
the thesaurus and the Harvard IV-4 psychosocial
dictionary with the same meaning as in the OCAI.
Third, include all grammatical and other deriva-
tional variants from the same root word with the
same meaning as in the OCAI. Finally, refine the
wordlist by assessing the context in which each
word appears in all 10-K filings (seeAndreou et al.,
2020a for more details on the measure construc-
tion). This procedure yields the OCAI lexicon,
containing a total of 89 unique lexical entries
related to the four CVF cultures listed in Table 2.3
Andreou et al. (2020a) conduct a battery of con-
struct validation tests and find strong evidence that
the textual measure accurately represents the vari-
ous cultural dimensions, as theorized by the CVF.
Using the OCAI textual measure of organiza-
tional culture, a firm’s thrust to compete is defined
as:
TC_SCORE = Number of occurrences of words describing the compete culture
Total number of occurrences of words for all CVF cultures
(1)
Scaling the frequency of words associated with
the compete culture by the frequency of words for
all the corporate cultures enables us to construct
a measure capturing the relative emphasis (or
intensity) that a firm places on corporate values
underpinning the compete culture vis-à-vis other
corporate cultures.4 In this regard, TC_SCORE
reflects the relative importance of corporate values
featured in the 10-K filings that propel a firm to
achieve superior financial performance by empha-
sizing organizational effectiveness, fast response to
3The full OCAI lexicon of culture words associated with
the lexical entries is listed in Table A2 in the online sup-
porting information.
4In the frequency count, we exclude instances of negation
(i.e. when a keyword is preceded by ‘no’, ‘non’, ‘not’, ‘less’,
‘few’ or ‘limited’ within plus or minus three words).
external information and enhanced competitive-
ness. In the empirical analyses, we use the variable
TC, which is the per year industry decile-ranked
value of TC_SCORE. This transformation fol-
lows the rationale in previous studies using textual
measures (e.g. Li, Lundholm and Minnis, 2013),
and enables the thrust-to-compete score to be
more comparable across time and industries, and
to mitigate any measurement errors.5
The main ingredient of TC is the bag of words
associated with the compete culture. In this regard,
Figure 2 presents some interesting properties of
TC by highlighting the frequency of the com-
pete culture-related lexical items used per 10-K
filing. We observe that the lexical stems compete*,
succeed* and achieve* rank highest in terms of fre-
quency of occurrence in the 10-K filings. This oc-
currence pattern is consistent with prominent cor-
porate traits that should emerge for the compete
culture within the CVF and corroborates that the
measurement of TC encompasses the relevant in-
formation as extracted from the firms’ 10-K filings.
Further, we examine the possibility that compete
culture words may proxy for tone or sentiment re-
ported by prior studies (e.g. Bodnaruk, Loughran
and McDonald, 2015; Ferguson et al., 2015;
Loughran and McDonald, 2011) or correlate with
specific categories of business dictionary words.
Figure 3 classifies the compete culture words
into various word categories provided in the
Loughran–McDonald Master Dictionary.6 The
dictionary classifies business words as they appear
in the 10-K filings into the following categories:
negative, positive, uncertainty, litigious, constrain-
ing, superfluous, interesting context, modal and
irregular verbs. Interestingly, the overlap between
the compete culture words and the various word
5In Tables A3 and A4 in the online supporting informa-
tion we provide several tests suggesting that the same in-
ferences hold truewhen usingTC_SCORE as themeasure
of a firm’s thrust to compete.
6The Loughran–McDonald Master Dictionary is avail-
able at https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/resources/.
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Figure 1. Types of corporate culture
Schematic representation of the four corporate cultures associated with the competing values framework.
Source: Cameron et al. (2014).
categories is minimal – the highest is 23%with pos-
itive words, a small proportion overlapswithwords
describing interesting context and irregular verbs,
while the majority of words (71%) are unclassi-
fied. This evidence builds confidence that the com-
pete culture bag of words does not overlap with
other renowned business word dictionaries that are
widely applied in finance and accounting research.
Measurement of institutional ownership
To calculate the total institutional ownership level
for each firm, we sum the shares owned by insti-
tutional investors per firm per quarter and divide
by the total number of shares outstanding. The
level of institutional ownership of a firm over a
given fiscal year is then the average total institu-
tional ownership over the four quarters in the fiscal
year. Next, following Bushee (1998, 2001), we clas-
sify institutional investors into three types, namely
transient, dedicated and quasi-indexers, based on
factors including portfolio turnover, diversifica-
tion andmomentum trading.7 Based on these sem-
inal studies (see also Chen, Harford and Li, 2007;
Gaspar,Massa andMatos, 2005;Harford,Kecskes
and Mansi, 2018), transient institutional investors
have highly diversified portfolios with a high port-
folio turnover rate. Non-transient institutional in-
vestors include dedicated and quasi-indexers. Ded-
icated investors are characterized as those with
concentrated portfolios and low turnover rates,
7The classification is obtained following the scheme pro-
vided on Brian Bushee’s website (https://accounting-
faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/bushee/). While we employ
this classification methodology to determine investor
types, we note that the literature also contains alternative
classification schemes to identify short-term and long-
term investors based on their holding information (e.g.
Gaspar et al., 2005; Switzer and Wang, 2017; Yan and
Zhang, 2009).
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Table 2. The OCAI lexicon










































This table exhibits the bag of words featuring lexical items that span each of the four CVF corporate cultures. The full list of 261 unique
words associated with lexical items annotated with * is featured in Table 2 of Andreou et al. (2020a).
Figure 2. Frequency of the compete culture lexical items
This figure presents the frequency (in logs) of the total number of compete culture lexical items occurring in 10-K filings for the sample
period 1994–2018.
while quasi-indexer investors are those institu-
tional investors characterized by low turnover,
high levels of portfolio diversity and long-term in-
vestment horizons. Quasi-indexer investors mainly
consist of indexing institutions and those with
portfolios that closely track a benchmark index.
On the whole, transient investors have a relatively
short-term investment horizon and in principle
trade heavily based on current earnings news, plac-
ing excessive emphasis on short-term performance
(Callen andFang, 2013; Cella, Ellul andGiannetti,
2013; Giannetti and Yu, 2020). Such investors in-
vest based on the likelihood of earning short-term
trading profits. Conversely, non-transient investors
are those that hold larger stakes in few firms and
have strong incentives to monitor firms to ensure
that their objective is to maximize long-term value
rather than meeting short-term earnings goals.
Accordingly, we define transient institutional
ownership, TRA, as the percentage of stock own-
ership in the firm held by institutional investors
that are classified as transient investors relative to
total shares outstanding. Dedicated institutional
ownership, DED, is defined as the percentage of
stock ownership in the firm held by institutional
investors that are classified as dedicated investors,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 3. Classifications for compete culture words
This figure shows the percentage of the compete culture lexical items classified in the tonal categories identified by Bodnaruk, Loughran
and McDonald (2015) and Loughran and McDonald (2011). Loughran and McDonald (2011) develop a dictionary of words from all
10-K filings and classify each word according to its most likely usage and sentiment in the financial documents. Those words classified
as ‘negative’ are indicative of some adverse implication. Conversely, ‘positive’ words are those that carry a favourable connotation in the
business world. Those words classified as ‘uncertainty’ are indicative of imprecision and/or risk, while those that reflect the potential for
legal contestation are denoted at ‘litigious’. Those words that express either strong or weak levels of confidence (i.e. strong and weak
modal words) are grouped and classified here as ‘modal’. Adopting a similar methodology to that used by Loughran and McDonald
(2011), Bodnaruk, Loughran and McDonald (2015) classify ‘constraining’ words as those that suggest financial constraints. Any lexical
items of the compete culture not classified in the previous categories appear in the final category, termed ‘unclassified’.
relative to total shares outstanding. Quasi-indexer
institutional ownership, QIX, is defined as the
percentage of stock ownership in the firm held
by institutional investors that are classified as
quasi-indexer investors, relative to total shares
outstanding.
Control variables, sample statistics and correlations
We include a large set of controls that capture
several firm-specific characteristics, including
number of years since the firm was first in-
cluded in the Compustat database, AGE; financial
leverage as indicated by long-term debt to total
assets, LEV; market to book value of equity,
MTB; research and development (R&D) intensity,
RD_INTENSITY; cuts on R&D expenditures,
RD_CUT; return on assets, ROA; and the natural
logarithm of market value of equity, SIZE. Fur-
thermore, to account for characteristics relating
to the 10-K filings, we include as controls the
Gunning FOG index, FOG, and the filing size in
kilobytes, FILESIZE, to account for the 10-K
readability, and the difference between the positive
and negative word frequencies to account for
language tone, NETTONE.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the
variables constructed for our empirical investiga-
tion. The mean and median values of thrust to
compete are 5.434 and 5, respectively, depicting
some positive skewness in thrust to compete score
distribution. For an average firm, the institutional
holdings by transient investors account for 13%,
dedicated investors account for 5.3% and quasi-
indexers account for 29.6%. Interestingly, Pearson
correlations exhibited in Table 4 show a positive
and statistically significant correlation betweenTC
and TRA (0.0103), consistent with our expecta-
tions that transient institutional ownership inten-
sifies a firm’s thrust to compete. Additionally, there
is a negative and statistically significant correlation
between TC, DED (−0.0532) and QIX (−0.0893),
suggesting that non-transient institutional owner-
ship diminishes a firm’s thrust to compete.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std dev. Q1 Median Q3
TC 52,882 5.434 2.871 3.000 5.000 8.000
TRA 52,882 0.130 0.121 0.032 0.102 0.196
DED 52,882 0.053 0.081 0.000 0.009 0.077
QIX 52,882 0.296 0.233 0.091 0.251 0.474
AGE 52,882 24.573 15.297 13.000 21.000 33.000
LEV 52,882 0.445 1.005 0.006 0.131 0.426
MTB 52,882 3.091 5.033 1.219 2.095 3.687
RD_INTENSITY 52,882 0.063 0.122 0.000 0.008 0.076
RD_CUT 52,882 0.269 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000
ROA 52,882 −0.039 0.254 −0.039 0.034 0.077
SIZE 52,882 5.938 1.990 4.510 5.892 7.259
FOG 52,882 19.852 1.157 19.122 19.794 20.487
FILESIZE 52,882 14.065 1.569 12.701 13.902 15.155
NETTONE 52,882 −0.008 0.005 −0.012 −0.009 −0.005
This table presents the sample number of observations (Obs.), mean, standard deviation (Std dev), 25th percentile (Q1), median and
75th percentile (Q3) for the main variables in the period 1994 to 2018. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Empirical results
Thrust to compete and institutional ownership
We investigate whether firms’ thrust to compete
is influenced by institutional ownership, placing
emphasis on the influence exerted by short-term
investors. Transient institutional investors pursue
short-term objectives and emphasize results right
now. Managers at a firm with a large propor-
tion of transient investors face the threat that
these investors may exit the firm by selling shares
(Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Parrino, Sias and
Starks, 2003), thereby undermining, inter alia,
the management’s future ability to raise capital.
Thus, transient investors are expected to intensify
a firm’s thrust to compete as managers succumb to
the pressure to deliver immediate superior perfor-
mance (see also Barton, Bailey and Zoffer, 2016).
To empirically investigate the relationship be-
tween institutional ownership and 1-year-ahead
thrust to compete, we estimate the following
baseline model:
TCt+1 = α1 + α2TRAt + α3DEDt + α4QIXt
+ α5AGEt + α6LEVt + α7MTBt
+ α8RD_INTENSITYt
+ α9RD_CUTt + α10ROAt
+ α11SIZEt + α12FOGt
+ α13FILESIZEt + α14NETTONEt
+ εt (2)
where the key variable of interest is the propor-
tion of transient investors, denoted by TRA. The
coefficient of interest is α2, whereby transient
institutional ownership is expected to be positively
related to 1-year-ahead thrust to compete (TCt+1 ).
Simultaneous inclusion of TRAwith the two types
of non-transient institutional ownership (DED
and QIX) enables us to mitigate potential corre-
lated omitted variable problems, since ownership
by transient investors can be (positively) corre-
lated with ownership by non-transient investors,
based on prior evidence that institutional investors
share common preferences (Gompers and Met-
rick, 2001). To control for omitted unobservable
firm characteristics that can simultaneously affect
the main explanatory variable (TRA) and the
dependent variable (TC), we incorporate several
time-varying controls and fixed effects. In this
vein, we include time and industry fixed effects
(where 48 industries are defined as in Fama and
French, 1997), along with a large array of relevant
control variables spanning a wide spectrum of
firm-related characteristics. We implement gen-
eralized least-squares random effects models to
control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, due to
the persistence in our non-transient institutional
ownership variables.8 Additionally, firm fixed
8Table A5 in the online supporting information tabulates
average transition probabilities from fiscal year t to t+1
for decile rankings of the three institutional ownership
types. The results show that firms in the lowest decile of
DED have a 78% probability of remaining in that decile
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































effects models are estimated to mitigate concerns
that omitted time-invariant firm characteristics
may be driving the findings. Other econometric
treatments are as follows: standard errors are
clustered at the firm level; all continuous variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to
mitigate the effect of outliers; and all continuous
variables are standardized to have a mean value
of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The results when estimating Eq. (2) are shown
in Table 5 (Panel A), with models (1) and (2)
reporting random effects estimations and models
(3) and (4) reporting firm fixed effects estimations.
Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients
for TRA in models (1) and (3) are equal to 0.023
and 0.019, respectively, and both highly statisti-
cally significant (p < 0.01). The results in models
(2) and (4), where all three institutional ownership
variables are included, provide additional empiri-
cal support that transient institutional ownership
increases a firm’s thrust to compete. In particular,
the results of model (4), which is estimated by in-
cluding firm fixed effects, provide strong support
for the notion that out of the three different types
of institutional investors, transient ownership
intensifies a firm’s operating philosophy related to
competition (compete culture).9
Prior studies report that the composition of
a firm’s institutional base can correlate with a
series of firm-level characteristics such as size,
stock price volatility, firm age and index member-
ship (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). To the extent
that these determinants of institutional ownership
also explain a firm’s thrust to compete, there can
be endogeneity confounding our results. To mit-
igate these concerns, in the spirit of Ramalinge-
gowda and Yu (2012), we re-estimate the above
regression using a measure of residual institu-
tional ownership, instead of the ownership vari-
ables themselves. The residual is estimated from an
the following year; meanwhile, firms in the highest decile
of DED remain in that decile the following year with a
probability of 58%. Likewise, TRA andQIX investors ex-
hibit high persistence from year to year, albeit less pro-
nounced compared to DED.
9In the same vein as these estimations, Table A6 in the
online supporting information reports results when esti-
mating Eq. (2) using the other three cultures (i.e. collab-
orate, control and create) as dependent variables. We ob-
serve that TRA does not influence the collaborate or cre-
ate cultures, and is negatively related to the control cul-
ture. These patterns show that TRA has a distinguishable
impact on the compete culture (TC).
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Academy of Management.
Institutional Ownership and Firms’ Thrust to Compete 13
Table 5. Regressions of institutional ownership on thrust to compete
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Institutional ownership (in year t) and 1-year-ahead thrust to compete (TCt+1)
TRAt 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.018***





AGEt −0.093*** −0.091*** −0.62 −0.614
(9.16) (8.91) (0.66) (0.66)
LEVt 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009
(0.08) (0.01) (1.47) (1.52)
MTBt 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.40) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27)
RD_INTENSITYt 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.029** 0.028**
(5.76) (5.73) (2.37) (2.33)
RD_CUTt 0.006 0.005 −0.003 −0.003
(0.61) (0.59) (0.29) (0.31)
ROAt −0.008 −0.008 −0.011 −0.012
(1.24) (1.20) (1.54) (1.59)
SIZEt −0.086*** −0.075*** −0.065*** −0.058***
(7.94) (6.53) (4.02) (3.52)
FOGt −0.005 −0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.75) (0.68) (0.19) (0.22)
FILESIZEt −0.062*** −0.063*** −0.028* −0.028*
(4.45) (4.52) (1.87) (1.91)
NETTONEt −0.014** −0.014** −0.012* −0.013*
(2.22) (2.28) (1.80) (1.84)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.49 0.49
N 52,882 52,882 52,882 52,882
Panel B: Residual institutional ownership (year t) and 1-year-ahead thrust to compete (TCt+1)
TRA_RESIDt 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.017** 0.016**





AGEt −0.087*** −0.089*** −0.663 −0.653
(8.28) (8.40) (0.57) (0.57)
LEVt 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011
(0.05) (0.22) (1.54) (1.63)
MTBt 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.73) (0.81) (0.75) (0.80)
RD_INTENSITYt 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.021 0.02
(5.32) (5.25) (1.53) (1.48)
RD_CUTt 0.007 0.007 −0.003 −0.003
(0.75) (0.71) (0.31) (0.34)
ROAt −0.004 −0.005 −0.012 −0.013
(0.57) (0.61) (1.40) (1.48)
SIZEt −0.080*** −0.078*** −0.061*** −0.060***
(7.27) (7.06) (3.56) (3.54)
FOGt −0.004 −0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.70) (0.65) (0.22) (0.24)
FILESIZEt −0.063*** −0.064*** −0.027* −0.028*
(4.36) (4.40) (1.76) (1.81)
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Table 5. (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Residual institutional ownership (year t) and 1-year-ahead thrust to compete (TCt+1)
NETTONEt −0.013* −0.013** −0.011 −0.012
(1.94) (2.02) (1.57) (1.62)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.49 0.49
N 48,599 48,599 48,599 48,599
Panel C: Second-stage results from instrumented institutional ownership (year t) and 1-year-ahead thrust to compete (TCt+1)
TRAt 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.030***







LEVt −0.019** −0.019** −0.017* −0.017*
(2.04) (2.04) (1.74) (1.75)
MTBt −0.015* −0.015* −0.013 −0.013
(1.87) (1.87) (1.61) (1.61)
RD_INTENSITYt 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(7.85) (7.85) (8.26) (8.26)
RD_CUTt 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.009
(0.99) (0.99) (0.61) (0.61)
ROAt 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(2.71) (2.72) (2.96) (2.95)
SIZEt −0.045*** −0.045*** −0.061*** −0.061***
(3.58) (3.58) (5.03) (5.03)
FOGt −0.025*** −0.025*** −0.025** −0.025**
(2.65) (2.65) (2.58) (2.57)
FILESIZEt −0.175*** −0.175*** −0.170*** −0.170***
(8.82) (8.82) (8.37) (8.37)
NETTONEt −0.014 −0.014 −0.017* −0.017*
(1.50) (1.50) (1.82) (1.82)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11
N 39,590 39,590 39,590 39,590
This table presents results from random effects regressions [models (1) and (2)] and firm fixed effects regressions [models (3) and (4)]
examining the impact of different types of institutional ownership on firms’ 1-year-ahead thrust to compete (TCt+1). Panel A shows
the results of transient investors (TRAt), dedicated investors (DEDt) and quasi-indexers (QIXt). Panel B shows the results of residual
percentage ownership by transient investors (TRA_RESIDt), dedicated investors (DED_RESIDt) and quasi-indexers (QIX_RESIDt),
following the approach of Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012). Panel C presents the second-stage results from the instrumental variable
approach, where TRAt,DEDt andQIXt are fitted values from a first-stage regression of these institutional ownership variables on a set
of instruments based on Bushee (2001) andCallen and Fang (2013). All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and the resulting t-statistics appear in parentheses. The continuous variables are standardized to
have a mean value of zero and variance of one. Definitions of all key variables are provided in Table 1. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
expected ownership model, which expresses own-
ership as a function of its economic determinants,
including firm age, dividend yield, S&P member-
ship, stock price volatility, firm size, stock price,
share turnover, book-to-market ratio, momen-
tum, Tobin’s Q and bid–ask spread. Accordingly,
TRA_RESID, DED_RESID and QIX_RESID
represent the residuals of our institutional owner-
ship measures TRA, DED and QIX, respectively.
This approach precludes the possibility that poten-
tial drivers of institutional ownership also explain
variations in a firm’s thrust to compete, thus mak-
ing a correction for time-varying omitted variables
and avoiding spurious results.
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In Table 5 (Panel B), we report the results when
themodel in Eq. (2) is estimated by replacingTRA,
DED and QIX with TRA_RESID, DED_RESID
and QIX_RESID, respectively. Interestingly, both
the sign and statistical significance of residual
transient ownership (TRA_RESID) in all the
models are comparable to those reported in Panel
A. In particular, the results in model (4) show that
transient is the only institutional ownership type
that significantly increases the 1-year-ahead thrust
to compete.
In further support of the above results, Table 5
(Panel C) reports the instrumental variable results
following a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estima-
tion of Eq. (2). A valid instrument induces changes
in the explanatory variable but has an independent
effect on the dependent variable. Thus, we use the
natural logarithm of a firm’s market value of eq-
uity, share turnover, whether the firm is a member
of the S&P 500 index, the firm’smarket model beta
estimated using up to 36 prior monthly returns, the
firm’s debt-to-asset ratio and the standard devia-
tion of the firm’s dailymarketmodel residuals over
the year as instruments for a firm’s institutional
ownership, since, consistent with prior work in
this area (see e.g. Bushee, 2001; Callen and Fang,
2013), these have been observed to satisfy the rele-
vance condition. As such, these factors are shown
to be correlated with the distribution of firm value
and thus unlikely to influence the firm’s thrust to
compete directly; hence, all the instruments should
also satisfy the exclusion condition. To implement
the instrumental approach, we follow two stages:
in the first stage, we separately regress institutional
ownership on the instruments and all baseline
control variables; in the second stage, we estimate
Eq. (2) using the instrumented institutional own-
ership variables, which are the fitted values from
the first-stage regression. The results for the first-
stage regressions (not reported for brevity) show
that all the instruments are significantly related
(p < 0.01) to institutional ownership, whereas
the resulting adjusted R2 (∼= 0.30) and F-statistic
(p ∼= 0) suggest that the model does not suffer
from the issue of weak instruments. Further, the
results of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) test for weak
instruments indicate that these instruments are
statistically relevant for our analysis.
The second-stage results from the instrumental
variable approach are shown in Table 5 (Panel
C), where we observe a positive and statistically
significant relationship between the instrumented
TRAt and TCt+1 across all the different model
specifications. Larcker and Rusticus (2010) point
out that when the instruments have low explana-
tory power in the first stage, it is common that the
estimated coefficients on the instrumented variable
in the second stage will become either unreason-
ably large or small. The similarity in coefficient
magnitudes of the instrumented TRA variable in
Panel C and of TRA in Panel A is an indication
that our models are well specified and point to a
causal relationship between transient institutional
ownership and 1-year-ahead thrust to compete.
Collectively, the results of Table 5 provide strong
evidence in support of our argument that tran-
sient institutional investors have a positive causal
effect on a firm’s 1-year-ahead thrust to compete.
Our inferences regarding this positive relationship
gain more merit in light of the fact that the ef-
fects of non-transient institutional investors (DED
and QIX) on thrust to compete appear to be ei-
ther negative or have no effect in models where we
impose firm fixed effects. Non-transient investors,
contrary to transient ones, in general hold diver-
sified portfolios, engage in long-term investment
relationships with firms and have different expec-
tations about performance (Appel, Gormley and
Keim, 2016; Bushee, 2001; Chen, Harford and
Li, 2007; Crane, Michenaud and Weston, 2015).
Therefore, while we expect transient investors to
intensify a firm’s thrust to compete, the same
should not hold true for non-transient investors.
Robustness evidence for the causal effects of
transient institutional ownership
In themodel specifications so far, we safeguard our
analyses from potential simultaneous causality
problems by relying on a lead-lagged relationship
between TC and TRA. Nevertheless, one could
suggest that because of some level of persistency
in the variables of interest, as shown in Table A5
in the online supporting information, the 1-year
time span between the key variables may still be
mechanically correlated. This can lead to con-
cerns that the results are still plagued by reverse
causality. To alleviate this possibility, we estimate
a time-dynamic model, with the intention of fur-
ther supporting the causal effect of institutional
ownership on thrust to compete. Accordingly,
we investigate the relationship between thrust
to compete and lagged differences and levels in
transient institutional ownership, at time spans
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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greater than 1 year, using the following models:
TCt+1 = γ1 + γ2TRAt + γ3TRAt−1 + γ4DEDt
+ γ5QIXt + γ6AGEt + γ7LEVt
+ γ8MTBt + γ9RD_INTENSITYt
+ γ10RD_CUTt + γ11ROAt
+ γ12SIZEt + γ13FOGt
+ γ14FILESIZEt + γ15NETTONEt
+ ut (3a)
TCt+1 = γ1 + γ2TRAt + γ3TRAt−1
+ γ4TRAt−2 + γ5DEDt + γ6QIXt
+ γ7AGEt + γ8LEVt + γ9MTBt
+ γ10RD_INTENSITYt
+ γ11RD_CUTt + γ12ROAt
+ γ13SIZEt + γ14FOGt
+ γ15FILESIZEt + γ16NETTONEt
+ ut (3b)
Table 6 reports the regression results for Eqs
(3a) and (3b). Random effects regression estimates
are provided in models (1) and (2), while models
(3) and (4) show the estimates from firm fixed
effects regressions. We focus our discussion on the
estimation results of Eq. (3b), where we consider
the influence of TRAt, TRAt−1 and TRAt−2
on future thrust to compete. In this regard, we
are examining the long-run relationship between
the variables of interest, since the time distance
between TCt+1 and TRAt−2 spans a 3-year period.
This distant lead-lagged relationship allows for
more reliable inferences because it makes model
estimates resilient to the presence of potential
simultaneity issues. It also sheds light on the (true)
direction of the association between transient
institutional ownership and future thrust to com-
pete. To support our previous findings, the empha-
sis is on coefficient γ4 in Eq. (3b), which we expect
to be positive and significant. To complement
the analysis, we also report the estimates of Eq.
(3a) in models (1) and (3), where the time distance
between TCt+1 and TRAt−1 spans a 2-year period.
Interestingly, the coefficient on TRAt−2 is 0.027
(p < 0.01) in model (2) and 0.018 (p < 0.10) in
model (4), thereby buttressing the claim for a
causal positive relationship between transient in-
stitutional ownership and firms’ thrust to compete.
SinceTRAt−2 is positively related to thrust to com-
pete as far as 3 years into the future, it is more likely
that transient ownership increases future thrust to
compete, rather than firms with higher thrust to
compete are attracting more transient investors.
All in all, reverse causality is a highly unlikely
explanation for our findings. Further, the coeffi-
cients of TRAt and TRAt−1 are also strongly
positive, with coefficients of 0.019 (p < 0.01) and
0.021 (p < 0.01), respectively for model (2), while
in model (4) these are 0.015 (p< 0.01) and 0.015 (p
< 0.05), respectively. These results provide further
supporting evidence that (within-firm) increases in
transient investors’ stockholdings further intensify
the firm’s future thrust to compete.10
Further, we estimate a dynamic panel GMM
model, since it is plausible that the relationship
between thrust to compete (TC) and transient
ownership is in fact dynamically endogenous.
Thus, it is possible that causation may run both
ways and that current levels of TC could affect
both future ownership levels and TC. Hence, to
control for potential dynamic endogeneity of this
kind, we follow Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012)
by adopting the dynamic panel GMM approach
(as proposed by Arellano and Bover, 1995 and
Blundell and Bond, 1998). More specifically, we
conduct GMM estimations, whereby two lags of
thrust to compete are included in the dynamic
model, and lags of independent variables up to
four periods are employed as instruments. One of
the advantages of this approach is that it allows
us to explicitly control for lagged values of TC.
Further, we are able to use the firms’ information
within our dataset as instruments. The empirical
10Another interpretation of these positive and highly sta-
tistically significant coefficients is the following: despite all
the endogeneity treatments we have performed and hav-
ing attested the contrary, let us suppose that the cross-
sectional variation in the level of institutional ownership
is endogenously determined by the cross-sectional varia-
tion in the level of some other omitted variables that we
cannot observe and thus we do not include in our regres-
sion models. It would be highly unlikely that the same en-
dogenous relationship would still confound the informa-
tion when using the time differences in institutional own-
ership. Therefore, after controlling forTRAt−2, the signif-
icance in the coefficients of TRAt and TRAt−1 lends
further credence to a causal positive relationship between
transient investors and a firm’s future thrust to compete,
especially considering model (4), where we also impose
firm fixed effects.
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Table 6. Time-dynamic regressions of institutional ownership on thrust to compete
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRAt 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.015***







DEDt −0.015** −0.013** −0.006 −0.005
(2.43) (2.05) (0.85) (0.69)
QIXt −0.018** −0.012 −0.013 −0.009
(2.03) (1.30) (1.35) (0.90)
AGEt −0.091*** −0.086*** −0.433 −1.29
(8.86) (7.96) (0.46) (0.54)
LEVt 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.011*
(0.01) (0.14) (1.56) (1.72)
MTBt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.24) (0.17) (0.30) (0.18)
RD_INTENSITYt 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.027** 0.024*
(5.64) (5.30) (2.20) (1.81)
RD_CUTt 0.007 0.007 −0.003 −0.005
(0.70) (0.74) (0.33) (0.49)
ROAt −0.007 −0.006 −0.011 −0.008
(1.09) (0.89) (1.47) (1.03)
SIZEt −0.075*** −0.082*** −0.058*** −0.062***
(6.54) (6.77) (3.49) (3.53)
FOGt −0.004 −0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.67) (0.59) (0.27) (0.31)
FILESIZEt −0.062*** −0.061*** −0.028* −0.028*
(4.46) (4.26) (1.87) (1.84)
NETTONEt −0.015** −0.015** −0.013* −0.015**
(2.37) (2.36) (1.93) (2.09)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.49 0.48
N 52,569 49,607 52,569 49,607
This table presents results from random effects regressions [models (1) and (2)] and firm fixed effects regressions [models (3) and (4)]
examining, by using time-dynamic model specifications, the impact of transient (TRA) ownership on firms’ 1-year-ahead thrust to
compete (TCt+1). We control for the percentage ownership by dedicated investors (DED) and quasi-indexers (QIX), along with a series
of other control variables. Definitions of all key variables are provided in Table 1. All regressions include year and industry fixed
effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and the resulting t-statistics appear in parentheses. The continuous variables
are standardized to have a mean value of zero and variance of one. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
model specification is as follows:
TCt+1 = β1 + β2TRAt + β3DEDt + β4QIXt
+ β5AGEt + β6LEVt + β7MTBt
+ β8RD_INTENSITYt
+ β9RD_CUTt + β10ROAt
+ β11SIZEt + β12FOGt
+ β13FILESIZEt + β14NETTONEt
+ β15TCt + β16TCt−1 + η + εt
(4)
where η is the unobserved individual firm effect.
In the estimation, we first-difference Eq. (4) to
eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and poten-
tial omitted variable bias. Next, we estimate the
first-differenced model by GMM using lagged
values (and differences) of TC and other firm
characteristics as instruments. The assumption
underlying such a choice of instruments is that all
the regressors, except firm age, year dummies and
industry dummies, are endogenous. Because our
dependent variable is 1-year-ahead thrust to com-
pete, the dynamic GMM model controls for the
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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AR(1) test p-value 0.00 0.00
AR(2) test p-value 0.45 0.47
Hansen test for over-identification p-value 0.72 0.73
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity p-value 0.83 0.87
N 52,826 52,826
This table presents dynamic panel GMM estimates of the relationship between institutional ownership – transient (TRAt), dedicated
(DEDt) and quasi-indexers (QIXt) – on firms’ 1-year-ahead thrust to compete (TCt+1). AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Hansen test for
over-identification is under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. The difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the
null hypothesis that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. Definitions of all key variables are provided in Table 1.
All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and the resulting t-statistics
appear in parentheses. The continuous variables are standardized to have amean value of zero and variance of one. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
influences of current and 1-year lagged values. All
regressions include year and industry fixed effects.
The GMM results are presented in Table 7.
Consistent with the results previously reported,
we provide evidence of a positive relationship
between transient ownership and 1-year-ahead
thrust to compete. To ensure the included lags
to control for dynamic endogeneity, we employ
Arellano and Bond (1991) (AR) tests of first-
order and second-order serial correlations. By
construction, there should be serial correlations
among the residuals in the first differences, namely
AR(1), but not in the second differences, namely
AR(2). Accordingly, we expect to reject the null
hypothesis in AR(1), but not in AR(2), which is
supported by the AR test p-values reported at the
bottom of Table 7. Given that we use multiple lags
as instruments, we also conduct Hansen’s (1982)
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Table 8. Regressions of thrust to compete on firm performance
(1) (2) (3)
















R2 0.05 0.07 0.07
N 52,617 52,617 52,617
This table reports ordinary least squares regression results investigating the impact of thrust to compete (TCt) on the dependent variable,
firms’ short-term performance as measured by stock returns (RETURNSt+1). High_TRA is an indicator variable for firms with high
levels of transient ownership, defined as those in the top tercile of TRA each year. Definitions of all key variables are provided in
Table 1. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and the resulting
t-statistics appear in parentheses. The continuous variables are standardized to have a mean value of zero and variance of one. ***, **
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
test for over-identification to assess the validity
of our instruments. In addition, we conduct the
difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity to deter-
mine whether the subset of instruments used in the
level equation is exogenous. Based on the p-values
reported in Table 7 for these specification tests,
we conclude that our dynamic GMM regressions
provide valid estimates.
Stock market implications of thrust to compete
Collectively, our findings in Tables 4–7 provide
robust causal evidence that transient institutional
investors positively influence, and intensify, a firm’s
thrust to compete even for periods spanning more
than 1 year. These investors appear to engage in
interventions with managers to affect firms’ cul-
ture and operating philosophy according to their
appetite for reaping short-term trading profits.
In this vein, we also provide evidence to support
the working hypothesis, whereby a firm’s thrust
to compete positively associates with short-term
performance, and transient institutional investors
exploit a firm’s thrust to compete as a channel to
influence the firm’s financial performance. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the following regression models:
RETURNSt+1 = a1 + a2TCt + a3AGEt
+ a4LEVt + a5MTBt
+ a6ROAt + a7SIZEt + et
(5a)
RETURNSt+1 = a1 + a2TCt + a3HIGH_TRAt
+ a4TCt ×HIGH_TRAt
+ a5AGEt + a6LEVt
+ a7MTBt + a8ROAt
+ a9SIZEt + et (5b)
The results of Eqs (5a) and (5b) are pre-
sented in Table 8, where the dependent variable
RETURNSt+1 is the one-period-ahead buy-and-
hold stock return. Specifically, models (1) and (2)
present the estimates of Eq. (5a), where we find
that the coefficients on TCt are both positive and
statistically significant, lending support to our
working hypothesis. Further, model (3) presents
the results of Eq. (5b), where we interact thrust
to compete with a dummy variable capturing high
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(i.e. in the top annual tercile) transient institutional
ownership,HIGH_TRAt. The results indicate that
firms with a high proportion of transient investors
indeed increase 1-year-ahead stock performance
through such firms’ thrust to compete.
The positive effects of thrust to compete on
short-term stock return performance as in Table 8
may paint an appealing picture, whereby at first
glance one can be tempted to interpret the re-
sults as firms benefitting from overly emphasizing
corporate values geared towards competition.
Notwithstanding this evidence, when a firm’s
thrust to compete is excessively intensified, the
management may become susceptible to making
suboptimal decisions and taking actions with
negative consequences that potentially harm firm
value in the long term (see also Andreou et al.,
2020b).With firms placing greater emphasis on the
pursuit of competitiveness and high achievements,
as dictated by their thrust to compete, managerial
incentives to conceal any bad news will naturally
be heightened as firms strive to consistently deliver
superior financial performance. Such operating en-
vironments, however, foster agency problems and
make firms vulnerable to adverse economic out-
comes in the formof large idiosyncratic stock price
declines, known as crash risk (Andreou, Louca
and Petrou, 2017; Callen and Fang, 2013, 2015;
Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian, 2009). Therefore,
to examine whether a greater level of TC is pos-
itively related to firm-specific stock price crash
risk, we estimate the following empirical model:
CRASH_RISKt+1 = b1 + b2TCt + b3AGEt
+ b4LEVt + b5MTBt





+ b12CRASH_RISKt + et
(6)
where the variable CRASH_RISKt+1 represents
three crash risk measures, namely NCSKEWt+1,
ESIGMAt+1 and DUVOLt+1. In particular,
NCSKEW is the negative of the third moment of
firm-specific weekly returns for each firm and year
by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly
returns, raised to the third power; ESIGMA is the
negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific
weekly returns from the average firm-specific
weekly return divided by the standard deviation
of firm-specific weekly returns; and DUVOL is
the log of the ratio of the standard deviation of
‘down weeks’ (i.e. below the annual mean returns)
over the standard deviation of the ‘up weeks’
(above the annual mean returns). We also include
the following additional controls for our crash
risk models: DTURNt, measured as the average
monthly turnover for the current fiscal year mi-
nus the average monthly share turnover for the
previous year; RETURNSt, the average weekly
returns over the fiscal year; STD_RETURNSt,
capturing the standard deviation of firm-specific
weekly returns; and ZSCOREt, which is Altman’s
(1968) z-score measure of firm’s financial stability.
We also include CRASH_RISKt to control for
last-period firm-specific stock price crashes.
The estimated coefficients of Eq. (6) are re-
ported in Table 9. We find a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between thrust to compete and
1-year-ahead crash risk.11 As crash risk relates di-
rectly to potentially devastating stock price drops
next period, this evidence unveils a dark side of
thrust to compete, which is harmful for long-term
value creation.
Additional analysis: is thrust to compete different
from product market competition?
Our thrust-to-compete (TC) measure is designed
to capture firms’ culture geared towards competi-
tion, as defined under the CVF. It is plausible that
it may have some association with other textual
measures intended to measure firms’ product mar-
ket competition. In this regard, we explore whether
a firm’s thrust to compete is indeed distinct from
Li et al.’s (2013) textually computed product mar-
ket competition measure, namely PROD_COMP.
Specifically, we estimate Li et al.’s (2013) measure
by counting the number of times the words ‘com-
petition’, ‘competitor’, ‘competitive’, ‘compete’
11Our results corroborate the findings of Andreou et al.
(2020b), who elaborate more on the dark side of the com-
pete culture. Specifically, they report that high compete
culture firms engage in earnings management practices,
which are associated with the hoarding of bad news that
is ultimately responsible for the occurrence of stock price
crashes.
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Table 9. Regressions of thrust to compete on crash risk
(1) (2) (3)
TCt 0.013*** 0.011** 0.009**
(2.71) (2.42) (2.22)
AGEt −0.046*** −0.047*** −0.039***
(8.32) (8.68) (7.57)
LEVt −0.017*** 0.005 −0.024***
(3.42) (1.12) (5.18)
MTBt 0.016*** 0.010** 0.015***
(3.09) (2.16) (3.07)
ROAt 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.075***
(8.62) (8.68) (13.61)
SIZEt 0.109*** 0.068*** 0.131***
(16.86) (11.82) (22.39)
DTURNt 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.027***
(5.93) (4.93) (6.40)
RETURNt −0.248*** −0.218*** −0.255***
(38.14) (42.62) (43.87)
STD_RETURNt −0.016** −0.044*** −0.038***
(2.45) (7.65) (6.58)








R2 0.10 0.08 0.12
N 52,012 52,012 52,012
This table reports ordinary least squares regression results investigating the impact of thrust to compete (TCt) on the dependent variable,
1-year-ahead stock price crash risk. In model (1), crash risk is measured usingNCSKEWt+1, which is the negative of the third moment
of firm-specific weekly returns for each firm and year by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power.
In model (2), ESIGMAt+1 is the crash risk measure, which is the negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from
the average firm-specific weekly return divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns. In model (3), DUVOLt+1 is
the crash risk measure, which is the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of ‘down weeks’ (i.e. below the annual mean returns) over
the standard deviation of ‘up weeks’ (above the annual mean returns). Control variables are those in previous tables and additional
crash risk-related controls, includingDTURNt, measured as the average monthly turnover for the current fiscal year minus the average
monthly share turnover for the previous year; RETURNSt, the average weekly returns over the fiscal year; STD_RETURNSt, the
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns; and ZSCOREt, Altman’s (1968) z-score measure of firms’ financial stability; and
lagged firm-specific crash risk. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level
and the resulting t-statistics appear in parentheses. The continuous variables are standardized to have amean value of zero and variance
of one. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
and ‘competing’, including those words with an
‘s’ appended, appear in a firm’s 10-K filing minus
those occasions when these words are preceded by
‘not’, ‘less’, ‘few’ or ‘limited’, with a gap of three
or fewer words. The measure is then scaled by the
number of words occurring in the 10-K filing.
In comparing the two measures, unlike
PROD_COMP, which concerns management’s
perceptions regarding their firm’s strategy for
operating in competitive environments, TC is op-
erationalized using a much more comprehensive
bag of words under the CVF and spans cultural
traits that pertain to firms’ operating philosophy
as a whole. Nevertheless, if TC simply reflects
variations in product market competition, it is
possible that the relations we document between
the institutional base composition and thrust
to compete are driven by the intensity of firms’
product market competition, as opposed to the
intensity of firms’ thrust to compete.12
12Univariate analysis of the relationship between institu-
tional ownership, thrust to compete and product mar-
ket competition is presented in Table A7 in the online
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Table 10. Robustness analysis: regressions of institutional ownership on product market competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Institutional ownership (in year t) and 1-year-ahead product market competition (PROD_COMPt+1)
TRAt −0.003 −0.003 −0.013* −0.013*





Controls YES YES YES YES
R2 0.05 0.05 0.55 0.55
N 52,882 52,882 52,882 52,882
Panel B: Time-dynamic regressions of institutional ownership (in year t) and 1-year-ahead product market competition
(PROD_COMPt+1)
TRAt −0.001 −0.001 −0.007 −0.008







DEDt 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.015*
(0.13) (0.86) (1.40) (1.93)
QIXt −0.014 −0.006 −0.006 0.001
(1.42) (0.60) (0.50) (0.08)
Controls YES YES YES YES
R2 0.05 0.05 0.49 0.48
N 52,569 49,607 52,569 49,607
This table presents results from random effects regressions [models (1) and (2)] and firm fixed effects regressions [models (3)
and (4)] examining the impact of different types of institutional ownership on firms’ 1-year-ahead product market competition
(PROD_COMPt+1). Panel A reports the results of transient investors (TRAt), dedicated investors (DEDt) and quasi-indexers (QIXt).
Panel B reports the results from time-dynamic model specifications for the impact of transient (TRA) ownership on firms’ 1-year-ahead
thrust to compete (TCt+1). All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and
the resulting t-statistics appear in parentheses. The continuous variables are standardized to have a mean value of zero and variance of
one. Definitions of all key variables are provided in Table 1. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
To exclude such a possibility, we re-estimate
Eqs (2) and (3a), (3b) by replacing TCt+1 with
PROD_COMPt+1. The main results are pre-
sented in Table 10, where the evidence suggests
a weak negative relationship between transient
institutional ownership and 1-year-ahead product
market competition, as defined by Li, Lund-
holm and Minnis (2013). Specifically, in Panel
A, the random effects results in models (1) and
(2) show an insignificant statistical relationship,
while the firm fixed effects results in models (3)
and (4) point to a marginally negative relationship
supporting information. We find that thrust to compete
and product market competition do not correlate simi-
larly with the institutional ownership characteristics.
between TCt+1 and PROD_COMPt+1. The time-
dynamic regression coefficients for product market
competition remain insignificant in Panel B. This
evidence indicates that transient institutional in-
vestors influence firms’ cultural traits and values,
shaping an operating philosophy that emphasizes
competition, and these effects are broader than
just focusing on product market competition.
Conclusion
Institutional ownership characteristics and pref-
erences play an important role in firms’ economic
decision-making. In this respect, recent research
shows that institutional investors’ investment
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horizons influence a firm’s governance and policy
choices. Our study contributes to this emerging lit-
erature by documenting for the first time a strong
positive influence of transient (or short-term) in-
stitutional investors on a firm’s thrust to compete.
We measure a firm’s thrust to compete based
on the attributes of organizational culture that
are geared towards achieving targets, delivering
results, competitiveness and market dominance.
The measurement relies on the culture taxonomy
of the CVF and the culture assessment dimensions
underpinning the OCAI. We use textual analysis
to measure a firm’s thrust to compete as the rel-
ative frequency of compete culture-related words
used in the firm’s annual 10-K filings.
The empirical results demonstrate that a greater
presence of transient institutional investors in a
firm’s capital base has a significantly positive im-
pact on its future thrust to compete. This indicates
that transient investors, whose desire is to reap
short-term trading profits, influence a firm’s oper-
ating philosophy to pursue short-run competitive-
ness and fast returns. By contrast, and as a falsifi-
cation test for the prior findings, our results show
a general tendency for an opposite negative effect
among the non-transient institutional investor
base, comprised of dedicated investors and quasi-
indexers, who focus on long-term value creation.
Overall, our results have important implications
of interest to academics and the wider business
community because they shed light on how the
composition of institutional owners shapes the
organizational culture and the operating philoso-
phies within firms.
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